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Abstract 
The goal of this study is to evaluate the effects of Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility and 
programmatic features on transitions from private insurance coverage among samples of 
American low-income children using monthly data from the 2001 panel of the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation (SIPP), a nationally representative data set. The 
estimation approach combines multilevel modeling and event history analysis, including 
a robust array of variables measuring programmatic features, individual child, family, 
and state attributes. Logistic regression results do not indicate an adverse effect of 
expanded Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility on private insurance coverage. Results also 
suggest that states which established stand-alone SCHIP programs can potentially limit 
crowd-out better than states which simply expanded their existing Medicaid programs 
and that waiting periods of less than six months might have a negative impact on private 
insurance coverage. Future studies should examine, in greater detail, how program 
features and other social policies can reduce crowd-out, while increasing public 
insurance take-up rates among the neediest populations. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
  
The decline in private insurance coverage has been worsened by the economic 
slowdown being experienced in the country. Consequently, un-insurance rates have 
continued to rise. However, insurance coverage among children is generally higher than 
that of adults. This somewhat favorable coverage among children can be linked to 
expansions to public insurance programs for children, the latest of which is the State 
Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). 
As part of governmental efforts to further expand public insurance for children, in 
August 1997, the U.S. Congress created the State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(SCHIP), as Title XXI of the Social Security Act. Title XXI makes provision for children 
living in families with income up to 200 percent of the FPL to be eligible for subsidized 
health insurance coverage. The legislation further gives states the option to expand 
income eligibility limits for subsidized health insurance coverage beyond 200 percent of 
poverty (Ku, Ullman, & Almeida, 1999). Some states have even extended such programs 
to entire families (The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2004). 
Prior studies have shown that earlier Medicaid expansions and the more recent 
implementation of SCHIP appeared to achieve significant successes as the proportion of 
children with Medicaid coverage increased (Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, 
National Center for Health Statistics, 2003; and Bansak & Raphael 2006) and the 
proportion of uninsured children living in families whose incomes were between 100 and 
200 percent of the FPL declined (Dubay, Hill, & Kenney, 2002).  
However, increases in public insurance coverage were accompanied by decreases 
in private insurance coverage (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National 
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Center for Health Statistics 2003; General Accounting Office, 1997 – now General 
Accountability Office; Cunningham, Hadley, & Reschovsky, 2002; Bansak & Raphael 
2006; and Sommers et al. 2007). The substitution of public insurance for private 
coverage, a phenomenon known as crowd-out, represents a potential unintended effect of 
Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility expansion. Crowd-out can occur in several different ways 
including when (1) individuals move from private to public coverage as a result of 
gaining eligibility through expansions; or (2) privately insured individuals may choose to 
become temporarily uninsured with the expectation of gaining access to public insurance 
coverage in the near future. The different pathways though which crowd-out occurs 
makes it a complex phenomenon, making it difficult to measure empirically. 
Other studies have examined relationships between public program design 
features and take-up rates of public insurance, especially among low-income individuals. 
One such public program design feature that may affect the type of coverage an 
individual has is the form (or administrative model) of Medicaid/SCHIP expansion 
chosen by a state. Under the legislation that established SCHIP, states have three options 
of implementing the program: (1) using SCHIP funds to expand their existing Medicaid 
programs, (2) designing a new stand-alone SCHIP program; or (3) combining (1) and (2). 
It is important to note that states which created new stand-alone SCHIP programs were 
given greater latitude to regulate participation in those stand-alone SCHIP programs. For 
example, if a state chooses to expand its Medicaid program, then existing Medicaid rules 
apply. States that have new stand-alone SCHIP programs can impose additional rules, 
which include enforcing enrollment caps, waiting periods before being enrolled, and 
other monitoring mechanisms aimed at curbing the displacement of private insurance. 
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These and other differences in programmatic features can potentially affect 
Medicaid/SCHIP take-up rates and, by extension, its possible substitution for private 
insurance. For example, if a state opts to establish a separate SCHIP program, it may be 
more attractive to families because of the stigma associated with traditional Medicaid. 
This situation is more likely if the separate SCHIP program has a semblance of some 
private insurance plan. In this case, one would expect having a separate SCHIP program 
to have a positive effect on the likelihood of participation in public programs, compared 
to the stigmatized expanded Medicaid. This a priori expectation will, however, depend 
on individual family’s valuation of private insurance, relative to its public options. 
Therefore, the effects of new stand-alone SCHIP, relative to expanding existing Medicaid 
programs, on participation rates and on private coverage are, a priori, ambiguous. 
LoSasso and Buchmueller (2002) included in their regression models a variable 
that measured whether a state expanded its existing Medicaid or established a new stand-
alone SCHIP program. The author noted that the inclusion of this program-specific 
variable, coupled with additional information, reduced estimates of public insurance 
program take-up rates and crowd-out tendencies. Kronebusch and Elbel (2004) also 
reported that expansions of existing Medicaid programs have been more successful in 
increasing children’s enrollment than stand-alone SCHIP programs. However, the 
imposition of certain lengths of waiting periods is said to reduce take-up rates of public 
insurance among low-income children (Kronebusch and Elbel 2004; and Bansak and 
Raphael 2006). 
Given the nature of the private insurance market, one can then posit that any 
public insurance program administrative model that tends to increase take-up of public 
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insurance is likely to have some negative impact on private insurance coverage by 
increasing the odds of transitions from private insurance, if adequate precaution to protect 
the latter is not taken. Very few studies have examined the effects of the form (or 
administrative model) of Medicaid/SCHIP expansions and mandatory waiting periods on 
private insurance coverage. Also, prior studies rarely explicitly analyzed the impact of 
these program design features, on a month-to-month basis, to examine transition patterns 
of insurance coverage. Since the length of time spent in a given insurance coverage 
affects the chances of making transition from one insurance coverage type to another, it is 
necessary to employ an analytical framework that incorporates the timing of transition 
patterns, one of the contributions being made by this study.  
This study takes advantage of the longitudinal nature of the 2001 panel of the 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), combining both event history and 
multilevel modeling techniques to examine the effects of public insurance design features 
on transitions from private health insurance among low-income U.S. children. The 
combined estimation techniques account for the timing of insurance coverage as well as 
clustering of children within states both of which are crucial for the study of health 
insurance dynamics.  
The objectives of this paper are to (a) examine the effects of the form (that is, 
administrative models) of Medicaid/SCHIP expansion and waiting periods on transitions 
from private insurance coverage; and (b) to investigate whether the post-1996 
Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility expansion crowds out private insurance coverage among 
sampled low-income children. Econometric models and results are discussed in sections 3 
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and 4, respectively, while section 5 discusses and summarizes study findings as well as 
presents conclusions. 
 
2. DATA AND METHODS 
I used the 2001 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). 
The SIPP, conducted by the United States Census Bureau, is a nationally representative 
longitudinal survey of civilian, non-institutionalized population of the United States. 
The 2001 SIPP panel is part of a longitudinal survey designed for the provision of 
detailed information on the economic situation of households and persons in the United 
States.  The data contain information on the distribution of income, wealth, and poverty 
in the U.S. and assess the effects of federal and state programs on the well-being of 
families and individuals (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2004). The survey was designed 
using a multistage stratified as well as clustered sampling technique.   
The interviewed population consists of individuals 15 years or older at the time of the 
first interview, excluding persons living in institutions or military barracks. Information 
on younger individuals who live with eligible interviewees is also included in the survey.  
One-fourth of the sampled households were interviewed each month and households 
were re-interviewed at four-month intervals. The 2001 panel consists of 9 interview 
periods, referred to as waves of data, with the first wave starting in February 2001 and the 
last in January 2004, which produced thirty-six months of data. Finally, topical modules, 
a series of supplemental questions on history of employment and program participation, 
health and disability, and utilization of health services were appended to the core data 
files. 
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The Bureau makes available the person-level records with state identifiers for all 
fifty states.  However, small states such as Maine, Vermont, North Dakota, South Dakota, 
and Wyoming do not have unique identifiers. This lack of unique state codes makes it 
difficult to measure state-level factors for these small states. Hence these states were not 
included in the analyses for this paper. SIPP provides a well-defined sample of low-
income individuals, especially because of the availability of information on monthly 
income over the three-year panel life. 
Health insurance and other questions covering the preceding four months were 
asked at each interview. However, the SIPP data set has what is known as “seam bias” 
concerning transitions between insurance coverage. “Seam bias” is said to occur when 
there are a disproportionate number of transitions every fourth month because of the 
tendency for SIPP respondents to report changes in their insurance status between 
interviews instead of between months covered by the interview (Short & Freedman 1998; 
Ham & Shore- Sheppard 2000; Doyle, Martin, & Moore 2000; and Card, Hildreth, & 
Shore- Sheppard 2001). A commonly used approach to handle the “seam bias” issue is to 
analyze inter-wave, that is, every fourth month transitions. However, analyses that 
examine inter-wave transitions might lose information on the timing of transitions that 
reportedly occurs between months other than the “seam” months (Ham & Shore-
Sheppard 2000). This study addresses the “seam bias” by making use of monthly 
information and also controlling for the “seam” months. Data on the form of program 
expansion and waiting periods were retrieved from reports of the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services. Finally, state employment data, from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, were appended to the SIPP.  
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Analytic Samples 
The sample for the study consisted of children aged 19 years and younger living 
in low-income families. Low-income children are defined as those with family monthly 
incomes below 350 percent of the federal poverty line (FPL). Following Short and Graefe 
(2003), a long-term measure of family income as a percentage of the FPL was adopted. 
This measure sums monthly family income for each individual over the thirty six months 
of the survey. The monthly poverty thresholds that were assigned to each person were 
also summed up over the thirty six months. Finally, the summed income was divided by 
the summed poverty thresholds to obtain a percentage of the FPL for each person. 
Limiting samples to children in families with incomes at or below 350 percent of the FPL 
ensured that the analyses made use of samples of children who had at least some 
probability of being eligible for Medicaid/SCHIP coverage under the Title XXI 
legislation that established SCHIP. 
Children included in the sample had at least a male or female family head present. 
Using the selection criteria of children’s age and family income, in addition to excluding 
children who were identified as married, who reported to have no other insurance but 
Medicare, and those who lived in states with no unique identifiers (as described earlier) 
produced an analytic sample of 7,994 low-income, unmarried children who were nineteen 
years old and younger. 
A sub-sample of children having private insurance was then created based on 
insurance status in month 9 of the SIPP survey. A child’s insurance coverage in the ninth 
month of the survey was considered his/her initial coverage type.  
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It should be noted that the information available in the SIPP does not say 
categorically whether a person is covered by Medicaid or a separate SCHIP program. It is 
possible for respondents who were covered by SCHIP to report it as private coverage. In 
order to minimize this likely misclassification of persons into insurance categories, I 
assigned Medicaid/SCHIP coverage status to individuals who were reported to be 
covered by both private and Medicaid. Nonetheless, there may still be some measurement 
error in the insurance variable. 
Based on insurance coverage type in month 9, the sample has 4,396 observations 
(person-level file) for children who had private. In order to use event history analysis, I 
converted the person-level data files into person-months file to analyze transition 
patterns. When transformed to person-month files, the private-to-Medicaid/SCHIP data 
file has a total of 108,113 person months, while the private-to-uninsured one has 108,584 
person months1. Also, the full samples were also stratified based on family income of 
less than 200 and 200-350 percent of the FPL to examine distributional effects. 
 
Estimation Techniques 
I used event history (or duration) analysis and multilevel modeling. The events of 
interest for this study are two types of transition in insurance coverage as follows: (1) 
private coverage to Medicaid/SCHIP; and (2) private coverage to becoming uninsured. 
Since the window of observation in the SIPP data set is not sufficiently wide to identify 
the actual starting months of each individual’s health insurance history, it is therefore 
                                                 
1It should be noted that there are differences in the number of observations (person months) for each pair of 
transition models. The different sample sizes represent differences in the number of person months that 
made transitions in each data file.  
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necessary to define an appropriate starting point of analysis, which is the initial time of an 
episode (or spell) being observed, for each event and for each individual. 
For this study, based on results of preliminary duration regression analyses, 
month 9 of the SIPP was selected to define the initial insurance status of sampled low-
income children. This was done by first identifying the observed beginning of private 
health insurance spells, that is, new spells. Then the probability of ending each spell was 
modeled as a function of a set of dummy variables that represented the length of spells 
and all other covariates in the regression models to be discussed in the next section. The 
time-in-spell dummies were measured in four-month intervals, for example, 1-4, 5-8… 
33-36, which gave a total of nine dummy variables. The appropriate choice of starting 
cross-section would be that interval where the effect of two adjacent dummy variables on 
the probability of ending a spell flattens out. That is, the point at which the two adjacent 
dichotomous variables are no longer different from each other.  
 The person-level SIPP data files were then transformed into person-month files, 
where spells of private insurance coverage were represented by rows of observations. 
Therefore, the unit of analysis is the person month.2 The transition probabilities from 
private insurance coverage to either Medicaid/SCHIP (public) or becoming uninsured 
were then estimated using discrete-time logit models, which specified random effects for 
the intercepts, the imputed Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility, and the form of program 
expansion variables. The two logit models included both time- varying and time- 
invariant covariates. 
                                                 
2 Multiple transitions were accounted for in these analyses, because repeated events ensured that maximum 
information from every observation was used. Compared with models that allow only a single transition per 
person-month, models of repeated events had greater probabilities of an event occurring, and also had 
better statistical fit. 
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Further, since children in each state of residence might have state-specific 
transition rates, I employed multilevel modeling approach, which corrects for clustering 
of children within states and non-constant variance in the error term. In this approach, 
children were considered as the level-1 unit of analysis, while states (where they lived), 
within which samples of children are clustered, made up the level-2 unit of analysis.  
 
3. ECONOMETRIC MODELS 
For each type of insurance spell, empirical models were specified to estimate the 
effects of explanatory variables on health insurance transition decisions. Generally, the 
discrete-time hazard rate is defined as 
],|Pr[ itiiit XtTtTP ≥==     (1) 
where T is the discrete random variable that gives the uncensored time of event 
occurrence. Equation (1) is the conditional probability that an event occurs at time t, for 
individual i, given that the event has not already occurred. 
Following Hox (1998), Miller (1998), and Barber, et al. (2000) to illustrate the 
estimation of the multilevel regression model, consider some data in which there are two 
levels of information: at the individual (or children level) and at the state of residence 
level. Let J be the number of states of residence and Nj  the number of children (level 1) 
in each state (level 2). The dependent variable, which is a level 1 variable, is Yij and the 
independent variable Xij, and on level 2, there is the independent variable Zj. Then we 
have a separate regression equation in each state of residence, which expresses a child’s 
outcome (transitions from private insurance coverage) as the sum of an intercept for the 
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child’s state of residence j0β , and a random error eij, associated with the i
th child in the jth 
state as follows: 
ijijjjij eXY ++= 10 ββ  where eij~N(0, )    (2) 
2σ
At level 2 (the state level), the BBj are modeled by explanatory variables at the state 
level: 
,001000 jjj UZ ++= γγβ        (3) 
.111101 jjj UZ ++= γγβ        (4) 
Substituting (3) and (4) into (2) yields the multilevel (mixed) model: 
ijjijjijjjijij eUXUXZZXY ++++++= 0111011000 γγγγ   
where 00γ  is the overall (grand) mean      (5) 
Specifically, the estimated six discrete-time logistic regressions, which is the 
individual-level equation, defined identically for each state, were of the form: 
 
)()()(
)()()()( )]1/([
istisktksistis
istisistisisistist
XXB
OldMedEligigMedSCHIPElPPLn
εβ
ββα
+++
++=−
 (6) 
 The dependent variable in equation (6) represents the logit of the probability of 
transitions from private insurance to either Medicaid/SCHIP or becoming uninsured in 
time interval t for child i living in state s, given that the child had private coverage at the 
beginning of time interval t; isα ( 00γ  in equation 5) is the estimate of the natural log of 
the baseline hazard of transition from private coverage during each interval t; 
MedSCHIPEligt(is) is the imputed Medicaid/SCHIP (post-1996) eligibility variable for a 
child i living in state s, at time t; OldMedEligt(is) is the imputed pre-SCHIP (or pre-1997) 
Medicaid eligibility expansion variable for a child i living in state s, at time t; Xt(is) 
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represents the matrix of individual and parent/family characteristics in state s and interval 
t; and represents the matrix of programmatic features such as the form of program 
expansion, dummies for waiting periods, and other state-specific variables, which vary 
across both states and/or time. The discrete-time hazards specification above gives an 
estimate of the baseline hazard of transitions from private health insurance state to either 
Medicaid/SCHIP or being uninsured. 
)(isktX
Variations in odds of transition across states are estimated by the level-2 equation 
below: 
kskqskskkoks ZqsZZ μθθθθβ +++++= ...2211     (7) 
The individual/family-level parameters,β , are assumed to vary across states as a 
function of state-level characteristics, Zs, as well as the random variations sμ . The level-2 
error terms, sμ represent the random effects that model the correlation between the timing 
of transitions for children within the same state. 
 The parameters of the mixed models were estimated by the generalized linear 
mixed model (GLIMMIX) estimation technique, using the GLIMMIX macro in SAS 
software, which employs a restricted maximum likelihood (REML) procedure. 
  
Dependent Variables 
 The first step was to identify types of insurance coverage. Mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive categories of coverage types are defined as follows: (1) Private, including 
military-related coverage; (2) Medicaid/SCHIP coverage; and (3) the uninsured. The 
following two transitions, starting in month 9 of the survey, were estimated: (1) private 
coverage to Medicaid/SCHIP (public); and (2) private coverage to being uninsured. Each 
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spell of reported private coverage defines a dependent variable, which is the conditional 
probability of switching from private insurance coverage to either public insurance or 
being uninsured when such a transition occurred between months 9 and 36. 
 
Independent variables 
  All variables are presented and described in Table 1. Explanatory variables 
included in specified models are children’s and family demographic characteristics, 
Medicaid/SCHIP, and other state-level factors. 
 The Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility variable was approximated by a dichotomous 
variable representing whether or not a child was eligible for Medicaid/SCHIP. Potential 
eligibility for the pre-1997 Medicaid eligibility was also imputed by using yearly 
eligibility criteria in each state. The eligibility variable incorporates the age of children 
and their state of residence; monthly family income; family size-adjusted FPL; and states’ 
Medicaid/SCHIP upper income thresholds on a month-to-month basis. The approach 
used to create this variable is similar to those used by Ham (2000) and Rosenbach, et al. 
(2001). The state-specific values of a year’s imputed eligibility variable were then 
assigned to every month in that particular year3. A dichotomous variable was created for 
the third group of sampled children who were not eligible for either pre-SCHIP Medicaid 
or post-1996 Medicaid/SCHIP because their family income levels were too high to 
qualify for Medicaid/SCHIP. The eligibility variable for the third group of children is the  
                                                 
3 According to the Department of Health and Human Services (2004), re-determination of SCHIP eligibility 
occurs every 12 months (a fiscal year) in most states, with the average period of re-determination being 
11.7 months. Additional information to impute the public insurance eligibility variable were collected from 
the Maternal and Child Health (MCH) updates issued by  the National Governors’ Association Center for 
Best Practices (1996-2000), the CMS website, individual state’s Medicaid/SCHIP websites, reports from 
the National Academy for State Health Policy, and other policy document sources. 
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Table 1:  Source, Level, Type, and Description of Variables. 
Variable Source/Level Type Description 
Explanatory variables 
CONTEXTUAL    
Medicaid/SCHIP* 
eligibility 
SIPP/Individual Time-varying 
(monthly). 
Imputed Medicaid/SCHIP variable (1,0) with 
1 indicating a child is eligible for the 
expansion. 
Old Medicaid* 
eligibility 
SIPP/Individual Time-varying 
(monthly). 
Imputed pre-SCHIP Medicaid variable (1,0) 
with 1 indicating a child is eligible for the old 
Medicaid. 
Separate SCHIP 
program 
CMS/Program Time-invariant. Binary variable (0,1) with 1 indicating that 
state expands eligibility by establishing a  
stand alone SCHIP program versus expanding 
existing Medicaid program. 
Mixed expansion 
CMS/Program Time-invariant. Binary variable (0,1) with 1 indicating that 
state increases eligibility by both Medicaid 
expansion and new SCHIP program versus 
expanding existing Medicaid program. 
5-month waiting time 
or less 
CMS/Program Time-invariant. Binary variable (0,1) with 1 indicating that 
state imposes a waiting period of one to five 
months versus no waiting period. 
Greater than 5-month 
waiting time 
CMS/Program Time-invariant. Binary variable (0,1) with 1 indicating that 
state imposes a waiting period of more than 
five months versus no waiting period. 
Income disregards 
CMS/Program Time-invariant. Binary variable (0,1) with 1 indicating that 
state uses income disregards. 
Unemployment BLS/State Time-varying 
(yearly). 
Continuous variable representing state’s un-
employment rates. 
Retail-service 
employment ratio 
BLS /State Time-invariant. Continuous variable representing share of 
state’s total employments in the retail or 
service sector. 
Medicaid/SCHIP 
effective 1997 
CMS/Program Time-invariant. Binary variable (0,1) with 1 indicating that 
state implemented post-1997 expansion in 
1997 versus 1998 or later. 
    
PARENT/FAMILY    
Mom works fulltime 
SIPP/Parent Time-varying 
(monthly). 
Dummy variable (0,1) with 1 indicating that 
parent works full-time. 
Mom works part-time 
SIPP/Parent Time-varying 
(monthly). 
Dummy variable (0,1) with 1 indicating that 
parent works part-time. 
Mom works other 
SIPP/Parent Time-varying 
(monthly). 
Dummy variable (0,1) with 1 indicating that 
parent works full- or part-time. 
         Continued on next page 
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Table 1: Continued 
Variable Source/Level Type Description 
PARENT/FAMILY 
 
   
Not a high school 
graduate 
SIPP / Parent Time-invariant 
(initial value). 
Binary variable (0,1) with 1 indicating 
attainment of some schooling but less than a 
high school diploma. 
Some college 
SIPP / Parent Time-invariant 
(initial value). 
Binary variable (0,1) with 1 indicating less 
than 4 years of college education. 
College graduate 
SIPP / Parent Time-invariant 
(initial value). 
Binary variable (0,1) with 1 indicating four 
years of college, i.e., a college graduate. 
Graduate education 
SIPP / Parent Time-invariant 
(initial value). 
Binary variable (0,1) with 1indicating post-
graduate education. 
Family stability 
SIPP/Family -----/---- Continuous variable indicating the number of 
months, within the window of observation, 
during which a child lives in a two-parent 
family. Updated monthly. 
Income-poverty ratio 
SIPP/Family Time-varying 
(monthly). 
Continuous variable representing family  
income as a %age of FPL 
AFDC Receipts 
SIPP/Family Time-varying 
(monthly). 
Binary variable (0,1) with 1 indicating AFDC 
receipt. 
Number of children 
under 18 
SIPP/Family Time-varying 
(monthly). 
Continuous variable for number of children 
under 18 years old in family. 
Resides in Northeast  
SIPP/Family Time-varying 
(monthly). 
A regional, binary variable (1,0) with 1 
indicating residence in the Northeast.  
Resides in Midwest 
SIPP/Family Time-varying 
(monthly). 
A regional, binary variable (1,0) with 1 
indicating residence in the Midwest.  
Resides in West 
SIPP/Family Time-varying 
(monthly). 
A regional, binary variable (1,0) with 1 
indicating residence in the West.  
    
INDIVIDUAL 
(CHILD)    
Child older than 5 
years 
SIPP/Individual Time-varying 
(monthly). 
Binary variable (0,1) with 1indicating children 
aged six years or older versus children less 
than six years old. 
    
Poor health status 
SIPP/Individual Time-varying 
(monthly). 
Binary variable (0,1) with 1 indicating fair or 
poor health. 
Black 
SIPP/Individual Time-invariant 
(initial value). 
Binary variable (0,1) with 1 indicating African 
American. 
Hispanic 
SIPP/Individual Time-invariant 
(initial value). 
Binary variable (0,1) with 1 indicating 
Hispanic. 
Other minority 
SIPP/Individual Time-invariant 
(initial value). 
Binary variable (0,1) with 1 indicating other 
minority racial groups. 
Seam month SIPP/Individual Time-varying Variable to capture “seam effect” in SIPP: 
equals 1 every fourth month, 0 otherwise. 
         Continued on next page  
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Table 1: Continued 
Variable Source/Level Type Description 
Duration_1-3months SIPP/Individual Time-varying Dummy duration variable (0,1) with 1 
indicating between 1-and 3-month long 
coverage spell.*** 
Duration_4-6months SIPP/Individual Time-varying Dummy duration variable (0,1) with 1 
indicating between 4-and 6-month long 
coverage spell.*** 
Duration_7-9months SIPP/Individual Time-varying Dummy duration variable (0,1) with 1 
indicating between 7-and 9-month long 
coverage spell.*** 
Response variables 
P(t=Ev1|Ev1>=t SIPP/Individual 
 
Time-varying. Conditional probability of an event 
representing transitions from private coverage 
to Medicaid/SCHIP coverage. 
P(t=Ev2|Ev2>=t SIPP/Individual 
 
Time-varying. Conditional probability of an event 
representing transitions from private coverage 
to being uninsured. 
*The reference category is children who are ineligible for public insurance coverage due to too 
high family income. 
 
 
 
reference (omitted) category. Therefore, the “Medicaid/SCHIP” eligibility, as described 
in Table 1 represents the difference between Medicaid/SCHIP-eligible children and those 
ineligible due to too high family income levels (denoted as A in Table 2). The “Old 
Medicaid eligibility” (denoted as B in Table 2) represents the difference between pre-
SCHIP Medicaid-eligible children and those ineligible due to too high family income 
levels. Finally, the differences between A and B, as shown in Table 2, capture the overall 
(or net) difference, in transition patterns, between Medicaid/SCHIP-eligible and pre-
SCHIP eligible low-income children. 4  
 
 
                                                 
4 Note that groups A and B  in Table 2 approximate coefficients of the imputed  SCHIP and pre-SCHIP 
Medicaid eligibility. 
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Table 2: An Illustration of Difference-in-Differences Hypothesis Tests for  
Crowd-Out 
Model 
 
Medicaid/SCHIP 
minus Ineligible
Old Medicaid 
minus Ineligible
Medicaid/SCHIP minus Old 
Medicaid
 1 2 3 
Private-to-Public A B A-B 
    
Private-to-uninsured A B A-B 
    
 
 
 
Evaluating the Presence and the Extent of Crowd-Out of Private Insurance by 
Medicaid/SCHIP Eligibility Expansion 
 
 Crowd-out is defined as the decline in private insurance that is attributable to the 
public program relative to the increase in public coverage. Generally, crowd-out is 
measured as the proportion of increase in the people enrolled in Medicaid/SCHIP that 
would have remained in private coverage in the absence of the Medicaid/SCHIP 
expansion (Blumberg, Dubay, & Norton 2000 and LoSasso & Buchmueller 2002). 
 The coefficient of the variable representing the Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility 
approximates the difference between the newly eligible children for the enhanced 
Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility, that is, the target group and ineligible children (comparison 
group) regarding the likelihood of making transitions from private insurance coverage to 
either public coverage or becoming uninsured. According to Blumberg, Dubay, and 
Norton (2000), the difference between the newly eligible and ineligible children, while 
controlling for measurable factors, is therefore due to the public program expansion.  
As discussed in Section 1, crowd-out of private insurance can occur in several ways, 
including: (1) individuals move from private to public coverage as a result of gaining 
eligibility through expansions; and (2) privately insured individuals may choose to 
become temporarily uninsured with the expectation of gaining access to public insurance 
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coverage in the near future.  Therefore, the following results will be consistent with 
crowd-out: 
(1) For the model predicting the conditional probability of transitions from private to 
public coverage, a statistically significant and positive sign on the coefficient of both 
“Medicaid/SCHIP” eligibility and also on the difference between “Medicaid/SCHIP” and 
“Old Medicaid” as illustrated in columns 1 and 3, respectively (Table 2); and 
(2) For the model of transitions from private coverage to becoming uninsured, a 
statistically significant and positive sign on both “Medicaid/SCHIP” and the difference 
between “Medicaid/SCHIP” and “Old Medicaid”. 
 
 4. RESULTS 
Descriptive Analysis of Characteristics of Person-months in Private Insurance Spells 
 
 Figure 1 displays the means, in percentage terms, of selected programmatic 
design features for low-income children in private insurance spells. The descriptive 
statistics (means and standard deviations) of all explanatory variables are presented in 
Tables 3. As shown in the table (and also in Figure 1), approximately 28 percent of the 
person-months in private coverage spells were months in which the child was 
Medicaid/SCHIP-eligible as opposed to only roughly 13 percent of the person-months in 
private coverage spells were eligible for pre-SCHIP Medicaid. These demonstrate some 
potential for crowd-out in the SCHIP program. Effectively, they indicate that a child 
experiencing a person-month of private coverage was more likely to be eligible for 
Medicaid/SCHIP coverage than a child experiencing a person-month of public coverage. 
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In terms of the administrative models adopted by states’ public insurance 
programs, about 52 percent of the person-months in private coverage were ones in which 
the child lived in a state that established a new SCHIP program as well as expanded its 
existing Medicaid program, that is, a mixed approach to expanding public insurance. On 
the other hand, 26 percents of the person-months were in states that only established new 
stand-alone SCHIP programs. These statistics might be indicative of some administrative 
barriers (aimed at curbing crowd-out of private insurance) imposed by stand-alone 
SCHIP programs, which tend to limit enrollment of children. One of the administrative 
barriers commonly adopted by states is the imposition of waiting periods, which requires 
that children have a lapse of coverage prior to enrollment in SCHIP. About 39 percent of 
the person-months in private coverage were ones in which the child lived in a state that  
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Figure 1: Distribution of Person-Months, by Programmatic 
Features
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imposed a waiting period of five months or less, while approximately 27 percent of the  
Table 3: Characteristics of Person-months in Private Insurance Coverage Spells: 
Full Analytic Sample  
Variable Mean (N=107,468) Standard Deviation 
Contextual Factors   
Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility 0.2767 0.4474 
Old Medicaid eligibility 0.1292 0.3354 
Separate SCHIP program 0.2601 0.4387 
Mixed Medicaid/ SCHIP expansion 0.5238 0.4994 
5-month waiting time or less 0.3907 0.4879 
Greater than 5-month waiting time 0.2727 0.4454 
Income disregards 0.5616 0.4962 
State unemployment rate 5.8739 1.5821 
Retail-service employment ratio 0.7413 0.0432 
Medicaid/SCHIP effective 1997 0.1733 0.3785 
   
Parent/Family Factors   
Mom works fulltime 0.5070 0.5000 
Mom works part-time 0.1789 0.3833 
Mom works: other 0.0266 0.1609 
Not a high school graduate 0.0856 0.2797 
Some college 0.3721 0.4834 
College graduate 0.1657 0.3718 
Graduate education 0.0473 0.2124 
Family stability 29.7328 13.6508 
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Income-poverty ratio 238.9688 114.0530 
AFDC receipts 0.0008 0.0278 
Number of children under 18 2.3304 1.2021 
Resides in Northeast 0.1635 0.3698 
Resides in Midwest 0.2742 0.4461 
Resides in West 0.2170 0.4122 
   
Individual/Child Characteristics   
Poor health status 0.0153 0.1228 
Black 0.1211 0.3262 
Hispanic 0.1069 0.3090 
Other minority 0.0417 0.2000 
Child older than 5 years 0.7574 0.4287 
Duration_1-3 months 0.0400 0.1959 
Duration_4-6 months 0.0327 0.1779 
Duration_7-9 months 0.0605 0.2384 
Seam month 0.2503 0.4332 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation, 2001 Longitudinal Panel. 
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person-months were in states having six or more months of waiting period before a child 
previously covered by private insurance can be enrolled in SCHIP. Again, these indicate 
an increased opportunity for the displacement of private insurance by SCHIP, especially 
if parent can afford to have their children experience a short-term uninsured period. 
 
Regressions Results of Transitions from Private Insurance Coverage
Estimated parameters were obtained from the multilevel models using the logit 
link discussed in Section 3. The results of insurance transitions of sampled children from 
private insurance coverage to public insurance and to becoming uninsured are presented 
in Table 4.  The positive sign of the coefficient on imputed “Medicaid/SCHIP” eligibility 
indicates that low-income children who were made eligible for the post-1996 
Medicaid/SCHIP expansion were more likely to make transitions from private to public 
insurance, relative to children ineligible due to high family income. This suggests that the 
enhanced Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility appears to encourage movements of newly eligible 
low income children from private to public insurance. The coefficient on this variable is, 
however, not statistically significant, indicating that the displacement of private 
insurance, that is, crowd-out may not be present. On the other hand, the coefficients on 
imputed pre-SCHIP (“Old Medicaid”) eligibility for both models of transitions from 
private insurance are positive and statistically significant. These results imply that 
privately insured children who are eligible for pre-SCHIP Medicaid coverage, relative to 
other children, are more likely to make transitions to public programs or to become 
uninsured. 
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Table 4: Multilevel Logit Models of Transitions from Private Insurance: Full 
Analytic Sample 
Variable Private-
Medicaid/SCHIP 
Transitions   
Private-Uninsured 
Transitions 
  
  Estimated 
Coefficient        
(.) Std Error 
t-Value Estimated    
Coefficient    
  (.) Std Error 
t-Value 
Intercept -4.9768*** -3.23 -33.9161 -0.44 
 (1.5389)  (77.3814)  
Contextual Factors     
Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility 0.2656 1.37 0.1260 0.60 
 (0.1943)  (0.2105)  
Old Medicaid eligibility 0.6349*** 3.01 0.5862*** 2.85 
 (0.2112)  (0.2058)  
Separate SCHIP program -0.7105** -2.35 -0.7011** -1.99 
 (0.3025)  (0.3522)  
Mixed Medicaid/ SCHIP expansion -0.6020** -2.27 0.1072 0.26 
 (0.2649)  (0.4063)  
5-month waiting time or less -0.1092 -0.42 0.6207** 2.14 
 (0.2609)  (0.2895)  
Greater than 5-month waiting time 0.2587 0.94 -0.0654 -0.19 
 (0.2738)  (0.3418)  
Income disregards -0.1414 -0.59 -0.0837 -0.24 
 (0.2406)  (0.3541)  
State unemployment rate 0.1228*** 3.42 0.1401*** 9.84 
 (0.0359)  (0.0142)  
Retail-service employment ratio -1.1398 -0.57 14.5664*** 9.52 
 (2.0005)  (1.5305)  
Medicaid/SCHIP effective 1997 -0.3385 -1.36 0.7858** 2.35 
 (0.2480)  (0.3340)  
Parent/Family Factors     
Mom works fulltime -0.4970*** -4.92 0.0009 0.02 
 (0.1011)  (0.0404)  
Mom works part-time -0.1933 -1.55 0.1782*** 3.64 
 (0.1244)  (0.0490)  
Mom works: other 0.6840*** 3.57 0.3904*** 4.19 
 (0.1915)  (0.0931)  
Not a high school graduate 0.5374*** 4.32 0.2847*** 5.18 
 (0.1244)  (0.0549)  
Some college -0.2934*** -2.86 0.0039 0.10 
 (0.1027)  (0.0377)  
College graduate -0.2260* -1.71 -0.4326*** -7.90 
 (0.1320)  (0.0548)  
Graduate education 0.1219 0.63 -0.0096 -0.12 
  (0.1934)  (0.0815)  
                  Continued on next page 
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Table 4: Continued 
Variable Private-
Medicaid/SCHIP 
Transitions   
Private-Uninsured 
Transitions 
  
  Estimated 
Coefficient        
(.) Std Error 
t-Value Estimated 
Coefficient 
(.) Std Error 
t-Value 
Family stability -0.0189*** -6.99 -0.0154*** -14.37 
 (0.0027)  (0.0011)  
Income-poverty ratio -0.0033*** -4.64 -0.0007*** -3.18 
 (0.0007)  (0.0002)  
AFDC receipts 0.9053** 2.07 2.3389*** 9.58 
 (0.4384)  (0.2442)  
Number of children under 18 -0.0476 -1.53 -0.0427*** -3.29 
 (0.0310)  (0.0130)  
Resides in Northeast 0.0885 0.24 -1.1505* -1.78 
 (0.3682)  (0.6454)  
Resides in Midwest -0.1563 -0.60 -0.3138 -0.64 
 (0.2626)  (0.4876)  
Resides in West 0.1162 0.37 -0.3314 -0.74 
 (0.3133)  (0.4504)  
Individual/Child Characteristics     
Poor health status 0.6869*** 3.12 -0.2975** -2.16 
 (0.2201)  (0.1377)  
Black 0.3916*** 3.24 0.0480 0.95 
 (0.1210)  (0.0506)  
Hispanic 0.3401*** 2.62 0.2003*** 3.95 
 (0.1298)  (0.0507)  
Other minority 0.9565*** 6.00 0.3265*** 4.40 
 (0.1594)  (0.0742)  
Child older than 5 years -0.0734 -0.78 0.0642* 1.66 
 (0.0939)  (0.0386)  
Duration_1-3 months -0.7480*** -3.36 19.3634 0.25 
 (0.2226)  (77.3717)  
Duration_4-6 months 2.0728*** 21.27 -3.2119*** -12.94 
 (0.0975)  (0.2482)  
Duration_7-9 months 0.1010 0.77 1.6205*** 38.07 
 (0.1320)  (0.0426)  
Seam month 2.6880*** 26.16 -0.4342*** -7.55 
 (0.1028)  (0.0575)  
     
LLR 1016970  2033239  
AIC 1016982  2033253  
Person Months (N) 108,113  108,584  
 *** Significant at the 1 percent level 
**Significant at the 5 percent level 
*Significant at the 10 percent level
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As expected, the negative signs associated with the “Separate SCHIP Program” variable, 
for both models of transitions, suggest that children who live in states that established 
new stand-alone SCHIP programs, relative to states that chose to expand their existing 
Medicaid programs, on average, are less likely to make transitions from private insurance 
to Medicaid/SCHIP coverage or to becoming uninsured, all else constant. Converting the 
logit estimates to odds ratio, this result implies that children living in states that 
established new stand-alone SCHIP programs, on average, are approximately 51 percent 
(0.4914 = e-0.7105; 0.4914-1 = -0.5086) less likely to switch from private coverage to 
Medicaid/SCHIP, compared to children living in states that chose to expand their existing 
Medicaid programs. 
Similarly, the odds ratio of transitions from private insurance to becoming 
uninsured is 1.4222 (e-0.7011). Therefore, the result implies that living in states that 
established new stand-alone SCHIP programs, on average, is approximately 42 percent 
(1.4222-1 = 0.4222) more likely to switch from private coverage to becoming uninsured, 
relative to children living in states that chose to expand their existing Medicaid programs. 
The negative sign on the coefficient of the variable measuring the administrative model 
of mixed approach to public program expansions, relative to expanding existing Medicaid 
programs, also indicates a similar effect on transitions from private to public insurance: 
children living in a state that adopted a mixed approach to its public program expansion, 
on average, is roughly 45 percent (0.5477 = e-0.6020; 0.5477-1 = -0.4523) less likely to 
switch from private coverage to Medicaid/SCHIP, compared to children living in a 
representative state that chose to expand its existing Medicaid program. These results 
might be an indication that establishing new stand-alone SCHIP programs or adopting the 
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mixed strategy to expand public programs, compared with expansion of existing 
Medicaid programs, are more protective of private insurance, but might be less generous 
regarding the take-up of public insurance. This implies that either establishing new stand-
alone SCHIP programs or adopting a mixed approach to expansions and expanding 
existing Medicaid programs did differ in their effects on both private coverage and public 
insurance take-up.  
The signs on the variables measuring lengths of waiting period that some states 
impose on children that were previously privately insured children are mixed and not 
statistically significant for the model of transitions from private to public insurance. 
However, the coefficient on the variable representing waiting periods of five months or 
less is positive and statistically significant for the model of transitions from private 
insurance to becoming uninsured. In terms of odds ratio, the logit estimate indicates that a 
child that lived in a state that imposed a waiting period of one to five months, on average, 
is approximately 86 percent (1.8602 = e0.6207; 1.8602-1 = 0.8602) more likely to make at 
least one transition from private coverage to becoming uninsured, relative to a child 
living in a state that did not have waiting period requirements.  
Expectedly, results also show that variables measuring states unemployment, state 
occupational mix, parent’s employment status and educational attainment, family 
stability, and a child’s racial affiliation are likely to affect transitions from private 
coverage to either public insurance or becoming uninsured. The mostly positive signs on 
the duration variables that measure the length of time of private insurance coverage 
before making transitions to either public coverage or being uninsured suggest that the 
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longer a child remains in private coverage, on average, the less likely the child is to 
switch to public coverage or to become uninsured.5
 
Estimating Crowd-Out Effect of Medicaid/SCHIP Eligibility on Private Insurance 
Table 5 presents the difference-in-differences estimates, which approximate net 
differences between SCHIP eligible and pre-SCHIP eligible children regarding health 
insurance transitions as a result of Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility expansion. As previously 
discussed, the coefficient on the variable that represents imputed Medicaid/SCHIP 
eligibility, for the two estimated models, approximates the difference in health insurance 
transitions between the target group of sampled children, that is, those who were 
potentially eligible for the expanded public insurance program, and the comparison 
group, that is, ineligible children due to having too high family income levels. In order to 
capture only transitions in health insurance attributable to the Medicaid/SCHIP 
eligibility, it is important to net out the effect of other market factors. Following an 
approach similar to that of Blumberg, Dubay, and Norton (2000) and Dubay and 
Blumberg (2006), I used a difference-in-differences estimation framework that serves to 
capture health insurance transitions while isolating relevant external factors. The 
differences in the coefficients on the “Medicaid/SCHIP” minus “Old Medicaid”, for the 
regression models, therefore give the net changes, which approximate the effect of 
Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility on the displacement of private insurance. These estimates, as 
presented in column 2 of Table 5, provide further tests of the effect of the post-1996 
Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility expansion on transitions from private insurance. 
                                                 
5 Tables of descriptive statistics and regression results for samples stratified by family income are presented 
in the Appendix. 
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Table 5: Summary Table of Difference-in-Differences Hypothesis Tests for 
Possible Displacement of Private Insurance Coverage  
Model of Transitions 
Medicaid/SCHIP minus 
Ineligible 
1 
Medicaid/SCHIP Eligible 
minus Old Medicaid Eligible 
2 
 Estimate t-value Estimate t-value 
  (.) Std Err   (.) Std Err   
Private-to-Public 0.2656 1.3700 -0.3693* -1.7017 
 (0.1943)  (0.2170)  
Private-to-Uninsured 0.126 0.6000 -0.4602 -1.6177 
  (0.2105)   (0.2845)   
*** Significant at the 1 percent level 
**Significant at the 5 percent level 
* Significant at the 10 percent level 
 
Therefore, if there was crowd-out during the period under analysis, for both 
models predicting the odds of transitions from private insurance, on Table 5, one would 
expect a statistically significant and positive signs on the variable representing the 
imputed Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility and also on the differences between 
“Medicaid/SCHIP” and “Old Medicaid” eligibility. 
The sign on the coefficient of the variable representing the imputed 
Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility is positive. The direction of effect indicates that the post-
1996 Medicaid/SCHIP expansion increases the likelihood of eligible low-income 
children, relative to ineligible ones, to make transitions from private to public insurance. 
The coefficient on this variable is, however, not statistically significant. However, the 
coefficient measuring the difference between “Medicaid/SCHIP” and “Old Medicaid” 
eligibility is negative but is weakly, statistically significant. This indicates that the 
enhanced Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility is likely to decrease the odds of making transitions 
from private coverage to public insurance decreases, all else constant. 
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The results from the models described above, based on the signs on the 
coefficients measuring the differences between “Medicaid/SCHIP” and “Old Medicaid” 
eligibility are not indicative of crowd-out. Rather, the results suggest that the post-1996 
Medicaid/SCHIP expansions, relative to pre-SCHIP expansions (or “Old Medicaid”), 
might have resulted in decreased movements of low-income children from private to 
public insurance. Although, the enhanced SCHIP eligibility expansion might have 
increased take-up rates of public insurance among eligible low-income children, the 
effectiveness of anti crowd-out measures could have slowed the rate of displacement of 
private coverage by public insurance. These findings might be indirectly due to the 
choice of administrative models that states adopted in expanding their public insurance 
programs. For example, regression results indicate that establishing new stand-alone 
SCHIP programs or adopting the mixed strategy to expand public programs, compared 
with expansion of existing Medicaid programs, are more protective of private insurance, 
but might be less effective regarding the take-up of public insurance. These findings 
could be due to the effectiveness of administrative models that tend to curb crowd-out. 
For example, states that established new stand-alone SCHIP programs have great latitude 
to incorporate anti crowd-out measures such as imposing waiting periods, enrollment 
caps, or premiums on participants. For instance, Kenny, et al. (2006) concluded the 
premium increases in SCHIP resulted in lower caseloads and/or earlier disenrollment 
from the programs in the states of Kansas, Kentucky, and New Hampshire.   
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5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
 In this study, I took advantage of the longitudinal formation of the SIPP data, 
using a combination of event history and multilevel modeling technique to (a) examine 
the effects of the form of Medicaid/SCHIP expansion and waiting periods on transitions 
from private insurance coverage; and (b) to evaluate whether the post-1996 
Medicaid/SCHIP expansion crowds out private insurance coverage among low-income 
children in the United States, while controlling for a robust array of individual, family, 
and state-level factors.  
 Findings from this study suggest that the expanded eligibility of SCHIP has not 
had adverse effects on private insurance coverage: results do not suggest that the 
expanded SCHIP eligibility has increased the likelihood of transitions from private to 
public coverage among low income children. There is, therefore, no evidence of crowd-
out of private insurance as a result of the Medicaid/SCHIP expansion during the period 
under study. This result is somewhat similar to that of Dubay and Blumberg (2006). 
Using the 1996 SIPP panel, they concluded that there was no evidence that SCHIP 
expansion caused significant movements of low income children from private to public 
coverage. 
The administrative models adopted by states to expand their public programs can 
have significant impacts on transitions from private insurance or uninsurance and, by 
extension, on take-up of public insurance. One major decision states faced in the SCHIP 
program was whether they would create a new, stand-alone program or whether they 
would simply expand the old Medicaid program. The latter had certain advantages of 
simplicity, at the cost of retaining the potential social stigma and other negative aspects 
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of Medicaid. The former gave states the advantage of establishing new rules that could 
limit crowd-out and reduce stigma, but there exist the problems of putting a new program 
in place such as startup cost and creating awareness among intended beneficiaries.  
Results indicate that children who live in states that established new stand-alone 
SCHIP programs, relative to states that chose to expand their existing Medicaid 
programs, on average, are approximately 51 percent less likely to make transitions from 
private insurance to Medicaid/SCHIP coverage, all else constant. The administrative 
model of mixed approach to public program expansions, relative to expanding existing 
Medicaid programs, is also indicated to have a similar effect on transitions from private 
to public insurance. Results further imply that privately insured children living in states 
that established new stand-alone SCHIP programs, on average, are approximately 42 
percent more likely to become uninsured, relative to similar children living in states that 
chose to expand their existing Medicaid programs. Put together, these results suggest that 
establishing new stand-alone SCHIP programs or adopting the mixed strategy to expand 
public programs, compared with the expansion of existing Medicaid programs, are more 
protective of private insurance, but might be less generous regarding the take-up of public 
insurance. This implies that either establishing new stand-alone SCHIP programs or 
adopting a mixed approach to expansions and expanding existing Medicaid programs did 
differ in their effects on both private coverage and public insurance take-up. 
These findings could be due to the effectiveness of anti crowd-out measures, such 
as waiting periods, that are aimed at discouraging unnecessary movements of children 
from private to public insurance. Budgetary constraints facing Medicaid/SCHIP programs 
could have also played a role in observed results. These anti-crow-out measures can 
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potentially discourage parents from enrolling their potentially eligible children in such 
stand-alone SCHIP programs, whether they are moving from either private coverage or 
uninsured status. These administrative “roadblocks” may offset the effects of reduced 
stigma enough to decrease enrollment in the new separate SCHIP programs. It should be 
noted that much of the decreases in private insurance coverage that have been recently 
observed might be partly due to economic slowdown, which makes private insurance less 
affordable, especially to the low income population through diminished employment 
opportunities for parents, which adversely affected opportunities for employer-provided 
insurance coverage for families. 
Findings also indicate that children living in a state that imposed a waiting period 
of one to five months, on average, are more likely to make transitions from private 
coverage to becoming uninsured, relative to children living in a state that did not have 
waiting period requirements. This result suggests that shorter waiting periods might not 
discourage parents from having their children uninsured for some time before being 
enrolled in Medicaid/SCHIP. It should be noted that some states required that individuals 
have a lapse of coverage or waiting period prior to SCHIP enrollment, which might have 
resulted in parents declining private coverage for a child (especially a seemingly healthy 
child) and experiencing a short-term uninsured period, in expectation of future SCHIP 
coverage.  
The above result regarding the effect of waiting period requirements on 
transitions from private coverage is somewhat consistent with those of the effects of 
forms of public program expansion discussed above. For example, when put together, the 
combined results might suggest that a child that lived in a state that both established a 
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new stand-alone SCHIP program and imposed a waiting period, relative to a state that 
chose to expand its existing Medicaid program with no waiting period requirements, on 
average, is less likely to switch from private coverage to public insurance. Therefore, if 
there are states experiencing proven cases of crowd-out, then it might be prudent for such 
states to adopt the strategy of establishing a new stand-alone SCHIP program or 
strengthening an already existing SCHIP program that imposes a waiting period longer 
than five months. If this strategy is to be adopted, precautions should be taken to avoid 
denying public insurance coverage to SCHIP-eligible children. It is note worthy to add 
that such an approach would come with some administrative costs. 
There are some limitations pertaining to the data and analysis that warrant caution 
against drawing definitive conclusions from the results as discussed above. A potential 
caveat to the results is that the imputed eligibility variable used in this study does not 
incorporate every state rule concerning expanded Medicaid/SCHIP. Some of these stem 
from a lack of precise variable measurements based on information that is available in the 
SIPP data set. For example, SCHIP coverage is not clearly identified in the SIPP data, a 
situation that could potentially lead to some measurement errors. Also, public program 
eligibility is imputed, which is hypothetical in nature as it is practically impossible to 
incorporate all exiting state rules used in determining eligibility. For instance, to calculate 
the amount of income disregards, information is needed on exact income deductions such 
as amount of child support received, work and child care expenses. However, SIPP does 
not provide information on the actual amount of child care expense.  
In spite of the limitations imposed by a lack of some information in the SIPP data 
set, this study contributes to literature by addressing gaps in the methodological approach 
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generally used in examining the dynamics of health insurance by combining both event 
history and multi-level modeling approaches thereby incorporating the timing of health 
insurance transitions, as well as adjusting for clustering of children within the states 
where they resided. Also, this paper enhances our understanding of the impact of 
different administrative models of states’ SCHIP/Medicaid programs on private and 
public coverage as well as the uninsured. Results from this study could inform health 
policy debates on how states might modify their Medicaid/SCHIP programs’ policy 
design features to (i) reduce the number of uninsured individuals, especially among the 
low-income population; and (ii) reduce crowd-out of  private insurance if necessary; (iii) 
more effectively target the neediest populations. The combination of (i) to (iii) can lead to 
effective and efficient reductions in the number of uninsured individuals as well as 
increased coverage and retention rates in private insurance. These efforts could 
potentially result in improved access to health care, especially among low-income 
populations, without necessarily increasing financial burdens on the taxpayer. 
Given the findings emanating from this study, there should be more in-depth 
study of public insurance program design features that directly affect take-up of public 
insurance, that is, a more detailed study of outreach efforts by states targeting uninsured 
low-income individuals. More detailed measures of personal, family, insurance coverage, 
and programmatic features (or policy interventions) should be developed to assess their 
effects on retention rates in private insurance as well as take-up rates of public insurance. 
Results from the estimated models suggest that the mixed public and private markets in 
insurance coverage for children continues to be a difficult balancing act for policymakers, 
as they try to improve insurance coverage without spending public dollars unnecessarily. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1A: Characteristics of Person-months in Private Insurance Coverage Spells: 
Family Income between 200 and 350 Percent of the Federal Poverty Level 
Variable Mean (N=75,055) Standard Deviation 
Contextual Factors   
Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility 0.1894 0.3919 
Old Medicaid eligibility 0.0562 0.2302 
Separate SCHIP program 0.2567 0.4368 
Mixed Medicaid/ SCHIP expansion 0.5237 0.4994 
5-month waiting time or less 0.3954 0.4889 
Greater than 5-month waiting time 0.2714 0.4447 
Income disregards 0.5590 0.4965 
State unemployment rate 5.8795 1.6019 
Retail-service employment ratio 0.7413 0.0422 
Medicaid/SCHIP effective 1997 0.1785 0.3829 
   
Parent/Family Factors   
Mom works fulltime 0.5383 0.4985 
Mom works part-time 0.1888 0.3913 
Mom works: other 0.0287 0.1670 
Not a high school graduate 0.0595 0.2366 
Some college 0.3908 0.4879 
College graduate 0.1848 0.3881 
Graduate education 0.0562 0.2303 
Family stability 31.0337 12.4147 
Income-poverty ratio 276.9072 104.4602 
AFDC receipts 0.0001 0.0089 
Number of children under 18 2.2177 1.0385 
Resides in Northeast 0.1712 0.3767 
Resides in Midwest 0.2985 0.4576 
Resides in West 0.2231 0.4163 
   
Individual/Child Characteristics   
Poor health status 0.0135 0.1152 
Black 0.1050 0.3066 
Hispanic 0.0928 0.2901 
Other minority 0.0386 0.1927 
Child older than 5 years 0.7594 0.4275 
Duration_1-3 months 0.0271 0.1624 
Duration_4-6 months 0.0238 0.1525 
Duration_7-9 months 0.0545 0.2270 
Seam month 0.2501 0.4331 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation, 2001 Longitudinal Panel. 
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Table 1B: Multilevel Logit Models of Transitions from Private Insurance: Family 
Income between 200 and 350 Percent of the Federal Poverty Level 
Variable Private-
Medicaid/SCHIP 
Transitions   
Private-
Uninsured 
Transitions   
  Estimated 
Coefficient       
(.) Std Error 
t-Value Estimated 
Coefficient     
(.) Std Error 
t-Value 
Intercept -5.7873** -2.59 -35.2601 -0.38 
 (2.2356)  (93.7787)  
Contextual Factors     
Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility 0.4646 1.52 0.2755 0.99 
 (0.3055)  (0.2771)  
Old Medicaid eligibility 0.8584*** 2.88 0.2685 0.93 
 (0.2980)  (0.2900)  
Separate SCHIP program -0.5054 -1.34 -0.1388 -0.33 
 (0.3768)  (0.4146)  
Mixed Medicaid/ SCHIP expansion -0.2147 -0.53 0.2047 0.44 
 (0.4085)  (0.4644)  
5-month waiting time or less -0.3893 -1.13 0.7835** 2.44 
 (0.3436)  (0.3206)  
Greater than 5-month waiting time 0.2162 0.59 -0.0912 -0.24 
 (0.3672)  (0.3867)  
Income disregards -0.5276* -1.67 -0.5321 -1.45 
 (0.3157)  (0.3663)  
State unemployment rate 0.0444 0.75 0.0875*** 4.34 
 (0.0591)  (0.0201)  
Retail-service employment ratio -0.1768 -0.06 16.4448*** 8.38 
 (2.8451)  (1.9620)  
Medicaid/SCHIP effective 1997 -0.5553* -1.77 1.0439*** 2.82 
 (0.3131)  (0.3704)  
Parent/Family Factors     
Mom works fulltime -0.5523*** -3.13 0.0533 0.93 
 (0.1764)  (0.0571)  
Mom works part-time 0.0011 0.01 0.3464*** 5.15 
 (0.2068)  (0.0673)  
Mom works: other 0.5622* 1.76 -0.1897 -1.28 
 (0.3200)  (0.1487)  
Not a high school graduate 0.6980*** 3.09 0.2727*** 3.17 
 (0.2255)  (0.0859)  
Some college -0.2400 -1.42 0.0069 0.13 
 (0.1685)  (0.0522)  
College graduate -0.3587 -1.60 -0.3356*** -4.75 
 (0.2244)  (0.0706)  
Graduate education 0.0301 0.10 -0.0312 -0.32 
  (0.2904)  (0.0984)  
         Continued on next page 
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Table 1B: Continued 
Variable Private-
Medicaid/SCHIP 
Transitions   
Private-
Uninsured 
Transitions   
  Estimated 
Coefficient        
(.) Std Error 
t-Value Estimated 
Coefficient     
(.) Std Error 
t-Value 
Family stability -0.0301*** -6.67 -0.0185 -12.13 
 (0.0045)  (0.0015)  
Income-poverty ratio -0.0004 -0.46 0.0002 0.76 
 (0.0008)  (0.0002)  
AFDC receipts -17.4131 0.00 -18.5972 0.00 
 (17034.0000)  (8337.3800)  
Number of children under 18 -0.1999*** -2.99 0.0098 0.46 
 (0.0669)  (0.0213)  
Resides in Northeast -0.1848 -0.43 -1.3574** -2.18 
 (0.4281)  (0.6224)  
Resides in Midwest -0.1125 -0.32 -0.1258 -0.27 
 (0.3498)  (0.4724)  
Resides in West 0.0356 0.09 -0.5616 -1.26 
 (0.3806)  (0.4474)  
Individual/Child Characteristics     
Poor health status 1.0925*** 3.39 0.3529** 2.21 
 (0.3222)  (0.1598)  
Black 0.5907*** 2.77 -0.2069** -2.66 
 (0.2132)  (0.0778)  
Hispanic 0.6793*** 3.35 0.1341* 1.88 
 (0.2030)  (0.0712)  
Other minority 0.8042*** 2.72 0.1631 1.46 
 (0.2954)  (0.1119)  
Child older than 5 years 0.0052 0.03 0.0888* 1.66 
 (0.1638)  (0.0536)  
Duration_1-3 months -0.2823 -0.79 -3.9931*** -6.27 
 (0.3561)  (0.6372)  
Duration_4-6 months 1.6714*** 8.72 1.7377*** 28.39 
 (0.1916)  (0.0612)  
Duration_7-9 months -0.0741 -0.33 -0.7078*** -8.10 
 (0.2256)  (0.0874)  
Seam month 2.7333*** 15.53 19.1041 0.20 
 (0.1760)  (93.7659)  
     
LLR 750848  1425817  
AIC 750860  1425831  
Person Months (N) 32,462  75,653  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level 
**Significant at the 5 percent level 
*Significant at the 10 percent level 
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Table 2A: Characteristics of Person-months in Private Insurance Coverage Spells: 
Family Income Less than 200 Percent of the Federal Poverty Level  
Variable Mean (N=31,949) Standard Deviation 
Contextual Factors   
Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility 0.4790 0.4996 
Old Medicaid eligibility 0.3014 0.4589 
Separate SCHIP program 0.2685 0.4432 
Mixed Medicaid/ SCHIP expansion 0.5222 0.4995 
5-month waiting time or less 0.3812 0.4857 
Greater than 5-month waiting time 0.2732 0.4456 
Income disregards 0.5663 0.4956 
State unemployment rate 5.8596 1.5249 
Retail-service employment ratio 0.7409 0.0449 
Medicaid/SCHIP effective 1997 0.1629 0.3693 
   
Parent/Family Factors   
Mom works fulltime 0.4319 0.4953 
Mom works part-time 0.1573 0.3640 
Mom works: other 0.0220 0.1467 
Not a high school graduate 0.1449 0.3520 
Some college 0.3271 0.4692 
College graduate 0.1231 0.3286 
Graduate education 0.0265 0.1607 
Family stability 26.7524 15.7291 
Income-poverty ratio 150.3089 79.9633 
AFDC receipts 0.0024 0.0490 
Number of children under 18 2.5997 1.4879 
Resides in Northeast 0.1475 0.3547 
Resides in Midwest 0.2177 0.4127 
Resides in West 0.2009 0.4007 
   
Individual/Child Characteristics   
Poor health status 0.0194 0.1379 
Black 0.1560 0.3629 
Hispanic 0.1391 0.3460 
Other minority 0.0482 0.2142 
Child older than 5 years 0.7504 0.4328 
Duration_1-3 months 0.0701 0.2553 
Duration_4-6 months 0.0536 0.2253 
Duration_7-9 months 0.0747 0.2629 
Seam month 0.2508 0.4335 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation, 2001 Longitudinal Panel. 
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Table2B: Multilevel Logit Models of Transitions from Private Insurance: Family 
Income Less than 200 Percent of the Federal Poverty Level 
Variable Private-
Medicaid/SCHIP 
Transitions   
Private-
Uninsured 
Transitions   
  Estimated 
Coefficient        
(.) Std Error 
t-Value Estimated 
Coefficient      
(.) Std Error 
t-Value 
Intercept -3.4993 -1.54 -29.4866 -0.23 
 (2.2689)  (129.8700)  
Contextual Factors     
Medicaid/SCHIP eligibility -0.3173 -1.24 -0.2864 -0.74 
 (0.2564)  (0.3853)  
Old Medicaid eligibility 0.1594 0.59 -0.2241 -0.57 
 (0.2709)  (0.3945)  
Separate SCHIP program -0.7429* -1.79 -1.2766* -1.82 
 (0.4152)  (0.7024)  
Mixed Medicaid/ SCHIP expansion -0.8025** -2.08 0.7455 1.05 
 (0.3855)  (0.7087)  
5-month waiting time or less 0.2638 0.66 0.2303 0.42 
 (0.3997)  (0.5465)  
Greater than 5-month waiting time 0.1649 0.41 0.3442 0.56 
 (0.4005)  (0.6184)  
Income disregards 0.0716 0.21 0.0434 0.07 
 (0.3449)  (0.6256)  
State unemployment rate 0.1499*** 3.16 0.1750*** 8.97 
 (0.0474)  (0.0195)  
Retail-service employment ratio -3.1955 -1.07 8.8865*** 3.91 
 (2.9924)  (2.2736)  
Medicaid/SCHIP effective 1997 -0.1695 -0.46 -0.0445 -0.07 
 (0.3701)  (0.6430)  
Parent/Family Factors     
Mom works fulltime -0.3827*** -2.94 0.0838 1.45 
 (0.1303)  (0.0579)  
Mom works part-time -0.2762 -1.64 0.0444 0.59 
 (0.1681)  (0.0756)  
Mom works: other 0.9831*** 3.87 0.9449*** 7.43 
 (0.2541)  (0.1272)  
Not a high school graduate 0.5221*** 3.28 0.3118*** 4.29 
 (0.1594)  (0.0727)  
Some college -0.1568 -1.13 0.0377 0.66 
 (0.1386)  (0.0570)  
College graduate -0.0419 -0.24 -0.6758*** -6.99 
 (0.1772)  (0.0967)  
Graduate education 0.3451 1.14 -0.4664** -2.44 
  (0.3026)  (0.1914)  
         Continued on next page 
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Table 2B:  Continued 
Variable Private-
Medicaid/SCHIP 
Transitions   
Private-
Uninsured 
Transitions   
  Estimated 
Coefficient        
(.) Std Error 
t-Value Estimated 
Coefficient      
(.) Std Error 
t-Value 
Family stability -0.0103*** -2.85 -0.0105*** -6.73 
 (0.0036)  (0.0016)  
Income-poverty ratio -0.0026** -2.24 -0.0049*** -8.68 
 (0.0012)  (0.0006)  
AFDC receipts 1.1055** 2.30 2.3819*** 9.78 
 (0.4815)  (0.2435)  
Number of children under 18 -0.0511 -1.35 -0.0834*** -4.87 
 (0.0378)  (0.0171)  
Resides in Northeast 0.2508 0.47 -0.4735 -0.40 
 (0.5325)  (1.1978)  
Resides in Midwest -0.0464 -0.11 -0.8189 -0.90 
 (0.4166)  (0.9076)  
Resides in West 0.2674 0.58 0.6500 0.74 
 (0.4636)  (0.8832)  
Individual/Child Characteristics     
Poor health status 0.3423 1.12 -1.4317*** -4.62 
 (0.3048)  (0.3101)  
Black 0.2161 1.40 0.3469*** 5.03 
 (0.1542)  (0.0690)  
Hispanic 0.2090 1.19 0.3457*** 4.76 
 (0.1752)  (0.0727)  
Other minority 0.9992*** 4.66 0.3761*** 3.55 
 (0.2142)  (0.1059)  
Child older than 5 years -0.1114 -0.91 -0.0108 -0.19 
 (0.1221)  (0.0563)  
Duration_1-3 months -1.1166*** -3.89 -3.2031*** -12.55 
 (0.2868)  (0.2552)  
Duration_4-6 months 2.0470*** 16.81 1.3812*** 22.98 
 (0.1218)  (0.0601)  
Duration_7-9 months 0.1047 0.62 -0.3656*** -4.86 
 (0.1678)  (0.0753)  
Seam month 2.6767*** 20.68 19.8527 0.15 
 (0.1294)  (129.8600)  
     
LLR 278127  612034  
AIC 278141  612048  
Person Months (N) 32,393  32,462  
*** Significant at the 1 percent level 
**Significant at the 5 percent level 
*Significant at the 10 percent level 
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